


VOLUME ONE
1834 — 1864

ATLAS OF THE NEW ZEALAND WARS

EARLY ENGAGEMENTS TO
THE SECOND TARANAKI WAR

DEREK LEASK



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OF THE
NEW
ZEALAND
WARS

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THE SECOND TARANAKI WAR

DEREK LEASK

To family,
past and present.

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PREFACE

On 25 November 1863, HMS *Eclipse* left Manukau Harbour for the short passage south to the Waikato Heads. Daniel Simpson, engineer and shipbuilder, and Charles Heaphy, surveyor, had instructions from Thomas Russell, the Minister for Colonial Defence, 'to select a site for the erection of the two gun boats now building in Sydney'.¹ The site was agreed and, soon, a dockyard built, at Port Waikato. The pieces of the first paddle steamer arrived, by ship, directly from Sydney to the Waikato River, and the first 900 rivets were driven home on 4 January 1864. By 12 February, PS *Koheroa* was on her maiden trip upriver with a cargo of much-needed supplies. The PS *Avon* had sunk just four days earlier. *Koheroa* proved crucial to Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron as his troops approached Te Rore and Pāterangi up the Waipā River.

Daniel Simpson (1811–1875), from Lancashire, was my great-great-grandfather. In 1990, he emerged from the historical mist and beckoned me to travel with him up the Waikato River, then up the Waipā River, and into what was now his war, and therefore my war.²

There was a second family catalyst. My immigrant ancestors came early to New Zealand, and James Benjamin Poynter (1842–1932), my great-grandfather, born in Tasmania, was the last of them, arriving in Wellington in February 1866. By 1867, with Charles Evans, he was a runholder in Poverty Bay, leasing Ngakarua, in the Waipaoa Valley.³ A year later, in 1868, Te Kooti turned Poynter's life inside out. On 20 July, as a trooper with the Poverty Bay Mounted Rifles, he was one of Major Charles Westrup's small force, out-thought and outfought at Paparatu. Evans was wounded; Poynter wasn't. On 10 November, both men were back at Ngakarua, and lucky to get away, as, further down the valley at Matawhero, Te Kooti had begun his slaughter of seventy men, women, and children. Poynter was alerted by neighbouring runholders and together the group found a circuitous back route over the hills to the redoubt at Tūranganui.

The tragedy of Matawhero had its upside for James Poynter when, later, he met Maraea Mōrete of Te Aitanga-a-Māhaki. She had been captured at Matawhero by Te Kooti's *kōkiri* (fighting force), and her husband, Pera Kararehe,⁴ had been murdered. Maraea and their child were forced to stay with Te Kooti's party at Pātūtahi and to march with them. She offended Te Kooti by rejecting his offer to make her his wife. Late in November 1868, her life now at risk, she took advantage of the fierce engagement at Mākaretū and escaped. Her reminiscences stop when she reached Ngakarua.⁵ Maraea was prominent as a witness in later trials of Te Kooti's men. James Poynter and Maraea Mōrete had a long liaison, and their son, James Benjamin Poynter Jr, was born in 1873. I was glad

of the encouragement of Maraea's great-grandson, Ben Poynter, as I joined what was just a short stretch of Te Kooti's long and tortuous trail.⁶

This was the start, for me, of a thirty-year venture. In the early 1990s I used the work of James Belich and James Cowan and others to give my research some context, but what I learned and understood about my family connections with the wars came primarily from the rich holdings of mid-1800s records and papers in libraries, museums and archives in New Zealand, Australia and Britain.⁷ In the process, I discovered the many maps that conflict had left behind. These maps and plans captured my attention and for three decades have driven my research into the New Zealand Wars.⁸

This *Atlas* is the result. The maps and plans etch onto the landscape the places where things happened. They throw light on the events themselves. And they follow the threads of the wars: the tracks of the 1840s, inland from the Bay of Islands towards the Hokianga and Ruapekapeka; the web of Te Rauparaha's influence radiating out from Kapiti to Port Nicholson and across Cook Strait; the Great South Road out of Auckland; the mighty Waikato River; the 1860s marches of the troops along the coast, southwards from New Plymouth and northwards from Whanganui; the paths of the Pai Mārire prophets across the country and along both coasts; the advance and the retreat of Tītōkōwaru; and the zig-zags of Te Kooti. Other maps show the land, divided, and show how the balance of 'Māori' and 'European' land shifted slowly at first, but ultimately at speed.

These nineteenth-century maps do not stand alone. In their many different repositories, they are embedded with contemporary written reports and other records that provide the backbone of the *Atlas* narrative. The maps and plans together have provided insights into what happened on the troubled ground of the mid-1800s, but also, at a broader level, into how the conflict and injustice of the nineteenth century unfolded. The intention is that this *Atlas* will do the same.

I am most grateful for the expertise, the enthusiasm and the courtesy of the scores of archivists and librarians and curators who have helped me explore the depths of their precious collections. I recognise, too, the historians and other professionals and academics who have advised me and encouraged me to write this *Atlas*. Auckland University Press warrants special gratitude. Thanks are due, too, to the many friends and colleagues who, over thirty-five years, have tolerated and supported my searches for nineteenth-century maps and plans. I must assure them, once again, that I am not truly obsessed. Just focused.

—Derek Leask, October 2024

INTRODUCTION

THE MAPS AND THE WARS

Māori knew their land. They understood how the mountains and the plains, the lakes and the rivers, the forests and the swamps (lots of swamps), and the harbours and the coastline fitted together. They knew the tracks among them and across them. They knew where respect was due for places that were tapu. Māori tradition records the discovery of these islands and the settlement of different regions by different iwi. Attachment to the land was central. Māori recorded, with some precision, how ownership of the whole of the land was divided among a multitude of iwi and hapū and sometimes whānau.⁹ Knowledge of the land and the naming of its features were held and used and passed on in oral tradition. Māori had these islands mapped.¹⁰

In contrast, prior to 1840, Europeans had no more than a sketchy idea of New Zealand. The coastline in European charts was passably defined but the interior was largely unknown and unmapped. The next forty years changed all that. After the signing of te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Treaty of Waitangi, British governors attempted to establish knowledge of, and authority over, what they called New Zealand. English, Scottish and Irish settlers arrived in large numbers seeking resources and land held by Māori. The result was a series of conflicts, wars and confiscations that changed the face of New Zealand beyond recognition.


The maps of New Zealand of the 1870s are starkly different from those of 1840.¹¹ The interior is no longer a mystery (with important exceptions like the King Country and Te Urewera). The empty bits in the middle are filled with towns, roads, railways and telegraph. New Zealand has been surveyed and mapped by Europeans.

The maps and plans in this *Atlas* show the dramatic military events that have come to be known as ‘the New Zealand Wars’—and ‘wars’ they were. At its peak in mid-1864, the British force reached 10,000 soldiers and six ships of the Royal Navy with a combined complement of 1,200.¹² Colonial forces in the North Island numbered 12,000.¹³ Over thirty years, the presence of the British military, whether fighting, or, as was mostly the case, not fighting, shaped the economy, the society, the security, the relationship between Māori and Pākehā, and the politics of the North Island.¹⁴ Māori forces over this same period are harder to define and to quantify. Total mobilisation at the peak of the Waikato War may have been 4,000, with a lesser number, perhaps 2,000, available at any one time for Kīngitanga forces.¹⁵ These Māori forces were backed by a wider Māori commitment to providing food, shelter, arms, ammunition and other supplies for those at ‘the front’. Māori capability was bolstered, too, by Māori occupation of the North Island’s centre ground and their mobility within it. The contest, as a result, was deadly serious, and, often, remarkably even. There were major battles and campaigns between March 1845 and January 1846 and from 1860 to 1869. And as the conflict moved across much of the North Island, Māori and Pākehā engineers made their own mark with substantial, and sophisticated, defences.

Five decades of maps and plans, from 1834 to 1884, reveal a diverse and complex series of skirmishes and fights, battles, campaigns and wars. They were all different, often markedly so. Each one had its own beginning, its own rationale, its own players and its own consequences. The maps do more than illustrate this narrative, they become an integral part of it. They become an important tool for understanding individual military defences and military engagements. To quote McKinnon, ‘they do more than locate—they enable the reader to follow the action’.¹⁶ The maps provide a pathway through the wars. They show the routes used as military forces and military supplies moved from one part of the country to the other. They reveal the paths and rivers and sea lanes that defined important strategic decisions, like Kawiti’s choice of Ruapekapeka as the site for his final pā of the Northern War, or General Duncan Cameron’s decision, in December 1863, that, to head south, he should use the Waipā River rather than the Waikato. They help to understand who was where and on what date. At the same time, the maps give a sense of the scale of the country and the challenges of its geography, as men and women on both sides advanced or retreated, or moved munitions or food around the country, or chased or fled, or escaped, or looked for a safe place to settle.

Many of the maps and plans of the first twenty-five years of the wars are records of the British government—the Colonial Office, the War Office, the Admiralty and the Treasury. In the mid-nineteenth century these were the departments, with their ministers, that governed New Zealand. Maps and plans were produced for many reasons. There were occasions when military leaders knew very little about what lay in front of them. As they began their campaigns in the Bay of Islands (1845), on the Waikato River (1863) and along the coast of Taranaki (1864), British commanders called for better maps. They needed them for reasons of strategy (should we campaign northward from Whanganui or southward from New Plymouth?). They needed them for reasons of supply (should we supply the troops by road from Drury or by boat through the Waikato Heads?). Above all, they needed them for operations. Where should we land the troops? Or, where should we put the guns? Or, where are the defensive rifle pits? Or, where are the weak points of the pā—if there are any?

There were reporting requirements, too. The general commanding in New Zealand ran his campaign. But major political and financial decisions about military commitments were mostly taken a long way off, in London. British military leaders, British ministers, the British Parliament, the British public, and sometimes the British sovereign, all wanted to understand what was happening. They wanted maps to bring to life the significant actions of their army and their navy—and they wanted to make judgements about successes and failures. Robert FitzRoy had to apologise at the start of the Northern War that he had no map fit to explain to a London audience what it meant to go inland towards Hokianga from the Bay of Islands.



| | NAMES OF TRIBES | POPULATION |
|----|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | RARAWA | 107 |
| 2 | NGAPUHI | 9489 |
| 3 | NGATIWHATUA | 505 |
| 4 | NGATIPADA & NGATIMARU | 2279 |
| 5 | WAIKATO | 5342 |
| 6 | NGATIMANIAPOTO | 2565 |
| 7 | NGATIWA | 6014 |
| 8 | NGATIWHAKAU or TEARAWA | 2260 |
| 9 | WHAKATOHEA | 1850 |
| 10 | NGATIPOROU | 4900 |
| 11 | NGATIKAHUNGUNU | 6339 |
| 12 | NGATIHAU | 5587 |
| 13 | NGATITUWHARETOA | 2000 |
| 14 | TARANAKI | 344 |
| 15 | NGATIRUANUI | 1705 |
| 16 | NGATIRAUKAWA | 2310 |
| 17 | NGATITOA | 831 |
| 18 | RANGITANE & NGATITAHU | 1000 |
| 19 | NGATITAMA | 268 |
| 20 | NGATIMAOE | 50 TOTAL 55,765 |
| | • NATIVE SETTLEMENTS | |

When Governor Thomas Gore Browne's despatch of March 1860 reached London, reporting the probability of a Taranaki War, his maps and his sketch of New Plymouth were duplicated in a matter of days for circulation to ministers.

There was intense interest, too, in detailed plans of Māori pā. At Horse Guards (Army Headquarters) and at Chatham (Royal Engineers), military men were anxious to learn what British troops were up against, most notably after British soldiers were decimated in front of Kawiti's pā at Ōhaeawai in 1845.

More mundanely, there was a requirement to budget for, and to account for, every penny of expenditure. Plans of British defences and military accommodation in New Zealand were all checked out in London. The Inspector General of Fortifications kept a close eye on his Royal Engineers.

There were sometimes other, more personal, motivations behind the maps, most obviously the goal of recognition or even promotion.¹⁷ And there is evidence enough in this *Atlas* that British soldiers, and especially the officers, enjoyed keeping diaries, making maps and drawing sketches. They knew they were making history and they wanted to record it.

The other great impulse for making maps was the colonial process of land acquisition, and the extension of British authority. Surveyors were first on the scene as new settlements were established. They explored new land (new to Pākehā, that is). They gave it new names and they prepared it for ownership and occupation. They established the lines for road and railway. The colonial government, almost from the outset, had a survey office, for the management of the ownership and transfer of land across New Zealand. Throughout the wars, central government and provincial government surveyors, as well as private surveyors, and their maps, were co-opted to the military cause. These maps appear throughout the *Atlas*.

This first volume of the *Atlas* carries just three plans drawn by Māori, one showing Kawiti's pā at Ruapekepeka; another, land ownership at Waitara; and the third, rifle pits at Kaitake. In each case they provide information unique to Māori and were probably drawn to meet Pākehā requests. These plans, accordingly, do little to fill an obvious, but unavoidable, gap in this *Atlas*. There are no plans, here, of 'mapping' by Māori for their own purposes. The evidence is that Māori moved with ease and precision across the country, building their defences, sorting out logistics and fighting their wars. But there are few specific examples of how information was shared. Ironically, the most powerful recognition of Māori design and planning is in the careful work done by British surveyors as they measured up the work of Māori engineers at Ōhaeawai and Ruapekepeka, at Te Ārei, at Rangiriri and Pāterangi, and at Pukehinahina (Gate Pā).

This raises the question whether the maps in this *Atlas* have a bias towards a British or colonial interpretation of the war. The answer is that of course they do. But the

0.1 Andrew Sinclair[?] (1833–1923), *New Zealand from Surveys in H.M.S.s Acheron, & Pandora*, separate title *Summary of Native Population*, 1856, [1859], 1860?

This engraved chart, *New Zealand from Surveys in H.M.S.s Acheron & Pandora*, was published in 1856 by the British Admiralty. The surveys were undertaken from 1848 to 1855. The coast is done in detail. The positions of mountains and other points of navigation are as accurate as survey allowed. For obvious reasons, the Hydrographic Office did not give great priority to the interior. The chart, as engraved, is probably a good representation of the state of Pākehā knowledge of the interior in the 1840s rather than in 1860.

In 1860, this particular example of Admiralty Chart 1212 was co-opted for a different purpose. Manuscript additions, many of them in colour, were made to produce the map *Summary of Native Population*.⁴ This may be the original of that map, done by Andrew Sinclair, the Government Surveyor, or it is a copy of his map.⁸ It serves the purpose for this *Atlas* of identifying the main locations of iwi across Te Waipounamu (the South Island) and Te Ika-a-Māui (the North Island). (This latter name the Hydrographic Office got wrong.) It was for this same purpose that the Governor, Thomas Gore Browne, sent a copy of Sinclair's map to Major General Pratt in Taranaki, nearly 165 years ago, on 5 August 1860.

Engraved, 94×63 cm, manuscript additions in pen and ink, hand-coloured
ATL: MapColl 830eod [1858?] Acc. 23590

0.2 John Cochrane Hoseason (1809-1884), *Track Chart and Plan of Steam Operations for Offensive & Defensive Warfare*, 1865, (1865-1870).

Captain John Hoseason's *Track Chart* shows the realities of a governor's communications with the Colonial Office, a factor in play throughout this *Atlas*.^c The distance from London to Auckland via Melbourne is 11,800 miles (18,800 km) and from Auckland to London via the Falkland Islands 12,500 miles (20,000 km) (not all legs of this travel are shown on the chart).^d An example is George Grey's despatch No. 35 of 30 November 1861 predicting a 'general war'. It was not received until 19 February 1862, about eleven weeks later. The reply in the other direction might take ten weeks.^e There was no possibility of asking questions, testing assumptions or seeking alternative views. The Colonial Office had no choice but to rely on colonial governors, even when they were not reliable. The only check, occasionally, was correspondence between an army commander and Army Headquarters in London, or a dose of realism privately expressed by bishop, judge, rangatira or disgruntled British subject in a new land.

Engraved, 61x96 cm, manuscript additions in pen and ink
Admiralty Chart 2598, TNA (PRO): MPH1/638



bias is recognised, limited and manageable. It was common enough for military and government leaders to put a gloss on their achievements and to disguise their failures, but the maps are less easily manipulated than the written word. The default setting for a map-maker was to be accurate, to draw the ground or the defences as they were, and to leave to others the important tasks of interpretation, explanation, deception, exaggeration (of wins) and minimisation (of losses). There were also occasions where there may have been bias in the decision *not* to draw a plan. For example, no official plans were done of the successful Māori attack at Boulcott's farm in the Hutt in 1846, nor of the British defeat at Puketakauere in northern Taranaki in 1860. In each case a good plan might have exposed the relative merits of Māori and British leadership, to the detriment of the British officer who decided no plan was necessary. In these cases, though, other official documents and a map from unofficial sources have filled the gap. Finally, while there may also be plans that, as Byrnes suggests, assert 'colonising power' or aim to control the interpretation of colonising actions, where these plans are identified their colonial intent can be an important part of the narrative.¹⁸

The maps and plans in this *Atlas* were selected to tell the story of the wars, starting in 1834, before the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, with the brief but fiery *Harriet* affair on the coast of Taranaki. This intervention was not truly part of the New Zealand Wars, but the rescue of the hostage Betty Guard and her children from the care of Taranaki and Ngāti Ruanui was done with an overwhelming display of British military and naval power.

Nine years later, conflict at the Wairau began when New Zealand Company leaders, hungry for land in the Wairau Valley, tried to use force to assert an authority they did not have. Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata took exception and twenty-two settlers were killed. No British or colonial military forces were involved.

The Northern War of 1845 to 1846 grew out of deep frustration on the part of northern chiefs that William Hobson and his treaty had taken away the authority and influence and wealth of the Bay of Islands, and had planted them afresh in his new capital on the Waitemata Harbour. All that Hobson left at the Bay of Islands was a flag on a pole, to remind the northern chiefs of a sovereignty that some of them did not accept. Flag and pole came down and the war that ensued was mainly a war about frustrated sovereignty. Ngāpuhi were divided, and fought on both sides.

The Southern Wars in Wellington/Hutt/Porirua (1846) and in Whanganui (1847) were driven by matters of land but, as was so often the case, land and sovereignty were

two strands of the same rope. Ownership of land in the Hutt Valley was hotly contested among chiefs from Wellington, the Hutt itself, Porirua and the Whanganui River. But the confrontation that ensued was also about who held authority at Port Nicholson (and across Cook Strait)—was it Governor George Grey or Ngāti Toa (Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata)? At Whanganui, as in Wellington, Māori interests were divided. The fighting of 1847 around Whanganui was in large measure a pre-emptive move by Te Mamaku and upriver Māori to safeguard land and sovereignty.

Land was soon central to the New Zealand Wars. By the late 1850s, Māori sought to assert their sovereignty, most notably by electing a Māori King and seeking to control the rapid transfer of land into Pākehā hands. Successive governors, Browne (to October 1861) and Grey (thereafter), were personally strongly averse to what they saw as an alternative or shared sovereignty.¹⁹ Their decisions were driven, too, by the political imperative of land for Pākehā settlers and speculators. It was inevitable that it was over matters of land that the clash of the sovereignties was to be resolved.

Volume One of this *Atlas* finishes with the fighting in Taranaki, first in 1860 to 1861 and renewed in 1863 to 1864. Early in 1860, Browne brought things to a head with a flawed land deal at Waitara. When the sale was opposed by Te Rangitāke (Wiremu Kīngi of Te Ātiawa), Browne brought armed forces to Taranaki. The result was the First Taranaki War. Iwi to the south—Taranaki, Ngā Ruahine and Ngāti Ruanui—became involved and, in time, so did Ngāti Maniapoto and Waikato from the north. There was war for a year and nobody won. Browne, well short of the crushing victory he was after, still demanded that Māori 'submit'. Many Māori refused.

For Browne this left unfinished business, not just in Taranaki but in the Waikato. The Taranaki outcome led to Browne, and, soon enough, Grey, confronting, on a new and more aggressive basis, the alternative sovereignty of 'rebel' iwi in Waikato and Taranaki. With Lieutenant General Cameron, they began to build the case, and the forces and the roads and the boats, and to pull together the maps they needed, for an invasion of the Waikato. Grey renewed the Taranaki War in April 1863, and three months later, on 12 July 1863, British troops crossed the Mangatāwhiri River to begin the invasion of the Waikato.

Volume Two of this *Atlas* will begin with the Waikato War. Much of the subsequent conflict covered in that volume can be seen as a corollary of what happened in the Waikato. Māori sovereignty was smothered. Land was confiscated. The dynamics of sovereignty, land and war were upended.


0.3 Sketch of the Colony of New Zealand, Shewing in Red the Sites of Military Posts, for use of the Naval and Military Committee from the Office of the Inspector General of Fortifications 6th Feb^y 1852, 1852.

This map was prepared in London in 1852, in the Office of the Inspector General of Fortifications, to illustrate formal reports and related correspondence about the organisation and expenditure of British military establishments in British colonies. The map identifies military posts, in 1852, at Auckland, the Bay of Islands, Wellington (sub-post Porirua) and Whanganui.

The map is included here for a wider, though still military, purpose. Annotations have been added to show, chapter by chapter, the locations of events in Volume One of this *Atlas*.

- 1 Bay of Islands
Chapter 2—1840–1841
Chapter 4—1845–1846
- 2 Auckland
Chapter 2—1840–1841
Chapter 5—1845–1860
- 3 Bay of Plenty
Chapter 2—1842–1843
- 4 Waikato
Chapter 5—1845–1860
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Chapter 1—1834
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- 6 Whanganui
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- 8 Wairau
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- 9 Wellington & Porirua
Chapter 6—1840–1848
- 10 Akaroa
Chapter 6—1845
- 11 Chatham Islands
Chapter 1—1838

Lithographed. 1 inch = 50 miles (1:3,168,000)
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1834 & 1838

EARLY ENGAGEMENTS



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